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Abstract
This paper investigates the hypothesis that generous unemployment bene￿ts
give rise to high levels of unemployment by systematically reviewing 34 cross-
country studies. In contrast to conventional literature surveys, I perform a
meta-analysis which applies regression techniques to a set of results taken from
the existing literature. The main ￿nding is that the choice of the primary data
and estimation method matter for the ￿nal outcome. The control variables in
the primary studies also a⁄ect the results.
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1 Introduction
There has been a popular belief held by many economists and in￿ uential organisa-
tions that generous unemployment bene￿ts and other labour market institutions are
responsible for high and persistent unemployment. In particular, the OECD argued
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1in the OECD Employment Outlook (1996, 1997, 1999) and the OECD Jobs Strategy
(1996) that so-called rigidities imposed by labour market institutions increased un-
employment. It suggested labour market deregulation as a remedy for unemployment
problems in the member countries. The IMF also argued that generous unemploy-
ment insurance systems have contributed to high unemployment (World Economic
Outlook, 2003). More recently, Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the European Cen-
tral Bank, acknowledged the need of labour market ￿ exibility in his speech.1
Over the last two decades, economists have analysed the relationship between
labour market institutions and unemployment using cross-country regression meth-
ods. It appears, however, that no clear consensus over the empirical evidence has
been reached. For example, Nickell et al. (2001) and Nunziata (2002) found a highly
signi￿cant positive correlation between the unemployment bene￿ts and the unem-
ployment rate, while Baker et al. (2003) found no clear relationship. Moreover, Belot
and van Ours (2001, 2004) reported that the generosity of the unemployment bene-
￿ts is negatively correlated with unemployment in several speci￿cations. What is it
that leads these economists to such di⁄erent results? Can we explain variation in the
results by their di⁄erent choices of data, estimation methods, and model speci￿ca-
tions? Will these studies reach an unanimous conclusion once one takes account of
the di⁄erences in the empirical settings?
To answer these questions, this paper presents a meta-analysis of existing cross-
country studies which look at the impact of labour market institutions on the aggre-
gate unemployment rate. More speci￿cally, it focuses on the question of whether or
not generous unemployment bene￿ts, in terms of high replacement rate and lengthy
durations of bene￿ts, create high unemployment. There are a few forerunners who
evaluate the robustness of the results of the e⁄ects of labour market institutions.
1The speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, Amsterdam, 15 February 2007.
2Baker et al. (2003) compared seven papers and acknowledged the lack of robustness
in the estimates. Bassanini and Duval (2006) showed how the estimates can vary
depending on empirical speci￿cations and the choice of the data.
This paper is the ￿rst to assess the link between generosity of unemployment
insurance systems and the level of unemployment using a meta￿ analysis. A meta-
analysis enables us to probe whether the variation in empirical outcomes found across
the studies relies on the use of di⁄erent regression methods, how the data are de￿ned
or organised, or which control variables are used in the primary studies. Identifying
the e⁄ects of di⁄erent empirical settings is essential for applied economists and policy
makers when discussing the disputed issue of the e⁄ect of unemployment bene￿ts on
the aggregate unemployment rate.
The meta-analysis is based on a specially constructed meta-data set by reviewing
34 studies that empirically analyse the relationship between measures of unemploy-
ment bene￿ts and the level of unemployment. This paper ￿nds that the choice of the
primary data, data de￿nition of unemployment bene￿ts variables, and empirical spec-
i￿cation have a considerable in￿ uence on the ￿nal outcomes. The included control
variables in the primary studies also a⁄ect the results whether the studies reached a
positive or no relationship between unemployment bene￿ts and unemployment rates.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the following section, I dis-
cuss the existing theoretical and microdata-based empirical literature concerning the
relationship between unemployment bene￿ts and unemployment. Section 3 describes
the methodology of meta-regression analysis. In section 4, I present the meta-data set.
The results from the baseline estimations and their sensitivity analysis are discussed
in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
32 Theories and Empirical Studies based on Micro-
data
Before beginning the meta-analysis of the cross-country studies which use aggregate
data, I take a brief look at the existing theoretical as well as micro-empirical literature
on the relationship between the generosity of unemployment insurance systems and
unemployment rate.
A highly in￿ uential theoretical work on how the generous unemployment insur-
ance systems a⁄ect individual unemployment spells was done by Mortensen (1977).
He argues that since unemployment compensation reduces the income foregone while
currently unemployed but does not a⁄ect future income, the expected search duration
increases with the bene￿t rate. At the same time, a worker either currently employed
or unemployed and not receiving bene￿ts will be eligible to receive the bene￿ts during
any future employer initiated unemployment spell. Consequently, an improvement
in either the bene￿t rate or the maximum bene￿t period makes current employment
relatively more attractive. In response, an individual who is unquali￿ed to receive
the bene￿t such as new entrants, exhaustees and those who quit will ￿nd employ-
ment more quickly by both lowering his/her reservation wage and by searching more
intensively. There is, thus, no strong theoretical reason to expect an unambiguous
relationship between the generosity of unemployment bene￿ts and individual unem-
ployment spells.
Thanks to the development of rich micro-data, a large number of empirical studies
have been done. The results in these studies are mixed. To name a few, Jones
(1995) found from the Canadian unemployment insurance system that the cut in
wage replacement rates is associated with longer individual unemployment spells.
Carling et al. (2001) found that a decrease in the replacement rate in the Swedish
4unemployment insurance from 80% to 75% caused an increase in the transition rate
from unemployment of roughly 10%. Similarly, Roed and Zhang (2003) show using
Norwegian data that a marginal increase in compensation reduces the escape rate
from unemployment signi￿cantly.
Despite the large number, these empirical studies based on micro-data have some
weakness. The fundamental limitation is due to their partial equilibrium nature. As
Holmlund (1998) acknowledged, the micro-data analyses on unemployment duration
are of only limited use, as they do not capture the general-equilibrium e⁄ects. From
a policy perspective, it is valuable to identify how di⁄erent unemployment bene￿t
regimes may result in the di⁄erence in the level of unemployment over a longer time
period. Theoretically, for example, we know that more more generous unemployment
bene￿ts may a⁄ect wage formation and induce higher wage demands, which can
increase the long-run unemployment rate. Here is where the cross-country studies
reviewed in this paper have an important role to play. However, as we shall see, these
studies have not yet reached a consensus.
3 Methodology
In this section, I describe the meta-analysis method. In contrast to conventional
literature surveys, a meta-analysis applies regression techniques to a set of results
taken from the existing literature to summarise the results on particular topics, to
provide an aggregate overview of a subject, and to allow an analysis of factors that
may in￿ uence the results. The main idea of this meta-analysis is that the coe¢ cient
estimates of unemployment bene￿ts in unemployment regressions are constant across
the studies if one successfully controls for the di⁄erent settings found in the empirical
studies. It enables us to quantify the e⁄ects of particular choices of data, estimation
5methods, or model speci￿cations for the outcomes in the primary studies.
The procedure of this meta-analysis is as follows. First, I search for empiri-
cal papers that investigate the e⁄ect of unemployment bene￿ts on unemployment
rate with cross-country data. Second, I review the selected papers and construct a
meta-data set that consists of meta-dependent and meta-independent variables. The
meta-dependent variables are the coe¢ cient estimates of unemployment bene￿ts in
unemployment equations drawn from regressions reported in the primary studies.
The meta-independent variables are the binary variables that characterise the em-
pirical settings of each regression. Third, I conduct meta-regression analysis using
probit models and OLS.
The meta-observations are obtained from existing journal articles and other pub-
lished or unpublished papers. I search for published articles using the search engine,
googlescholar, with search words "labour market institutions" & "unemployment"
or "unemployment bene￿t j unemployment insurance" & "unemployment". Unpub-
lished working papers, dissertations, essays, and mimeographs are found by the search
engine google.2 References in each paper are cross searched until no new studies are
found. I consider only the papers that are from the year 1988 and up until march,
2007, when this study was started. This restriction, however, does not exclude any
earlier relevant studies because most of the studies are done after the year 1996, when
the extensive panel data set of labour market institutions became available.
To be an observation point in this meta-analysis, a study is required to have
(1) an empirical analysis of the cross-country data of the OECD countries, (2) well-
de￿ned and well-reported source of the data, and (3) the estimates derived from a
regression analysis with a dependent variable measuring the level of the aggregate
2Although previous meta-studies in other topics used other computerised data bases as IDEAS
and RePEc, EconLit, in recent years, googlescholar comprises all above databases.
6unemployment rate and independent variables any among three measures of generos-
ity of unemployment bene￿ts, i.e. unemployment bene￿t replacement ratio, bene￿t
duration, or an interaction of these two. I also include regressions when their de-
pendent variables are long-term or youth unemployment rate.3 A large fraction of
articles were either theoretical or micro-data analyses and discarded from this analy-
sis. Studies that analysed only one or a few countries, or each country separately are
excluded. Finally, 34 papers that ful￿ll the requirement are included in this meta-
analysis. When more than one regression is reported, I use all estimates that meet
the above requirements. Taking multiple estimates from an article is preferable to
collecting a single value only from each study, because procedures representing each
study by a single value result in a serious bias and a loss of information (Bijmolt and
Pieters, 2001).4
The meta-data are ￿rst estimated using a probit model. Employing a probit
model for a meta-analysis in this fashion is novel. The goal of the ￿rst experiment
is to identify the factors that produce signi￿cant positive correlations between the
generosity of unemployment bene￿ts and the level of unemployment. For this exper-
iment, I construct the binary meta-dependent variables.5 The probit meta-regression
is
Pr(bj = 1jZj1;Zj2;:::;ZjK) = G(￿ +
K X
k=1
￿kZjk); j = 1;2;:::L,
where bj is the binary meta-dependent variable constructed from the reported es-
3The studies that analysed male and female unemployment rate separately such as Jimeno &
Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2002) are not included in this meta-analysis.
4The e⁄ect of publication bias is partially mitigated by sampling all estimates in each primary
study and by including both published and unpublished studies.
5If the reported estimate of the measures of unemployment bene￿ts from the primary equations
is signi￿cantly positive at the 10% level, the binary meta-dependent variable gets the value 1.
Otherwise, it gets the value 0. I also conducted the probit meta-analysis with the binary meta-
dependent variables with the signi￿cant level of 5% and 1%. The estimated results are consistent
with those of the 10% level.
7timates in the jth regression in the literature comprised of L regressions, ￿ is the
summary value of the marginal e⁄ect b, the Zjk￿ s are the meta-independent variables
which measure relevant characteristics of the observation, and the ￿k￿ s are the meta-
regression coe¢ cients which re￿ ect the e⁄ect of particular regression characteristics.
G is the standard normal c.d.f. Since the observations within paper are more likely
to share similar characteristics, the data are estimated with robust standard errors
for clustered samples by paper.
Following this, I run an experiment in which I use the coe¢ cient estimates them-
selves as the dependent variables. The goal of this second experiment is to quantify
factors that give rise to large correlations between the generosity of unemployment
bene￿ts and the level of aggregate unemployment. The meta-regression model is
estimated using OLS,
bj = ￿ +
K X
k=1
￿kZjk + ej; j = 1;2;:::L,
where bj is the reported estimate and ￿ the summary value of the e⁄ect of generosity
of unemployment bene￿ts in unemployment rate. The meta-regression coe¢ cient ￿k
re￿ ects the marginal e⁄ect of particular regression characteristics. The error term
ej is robust for clustered samples by paper.6 In the sensitivity analysis, I include
the estimation by weighted least squares (WLS), where each coe¢ cient estimate is
weighted by the inverse of its standard error.7
6Jeppesen et al. (2002) and Disdier & Head (2008) suggest random e⁄ects panel speci￿cation to
deal with the multiple estimates from each paper. The random e⁄ects model places greater emphasis
on within-paper variation than cross paper variation. The Breusch-Pagan tests imply that the
researcher random e⁄ects are insigni￿cant for the coe¢ cient estimates of duration of unemployment
bene￿ts (BD) and the interaction (BRRBD). The existence of the random e⁄ects is ambiguous for
those of bene￿t replacement rate (BRR). This suggests that researchers in this literature are not
conducting research in a manner fundamentally di⁄erent from one another. Hence, I use the OLS
and probit model for the baseline regressions.
7The WLS is one of the common practice in meta-regression analysis, when one is interested
in the particular e⁄ect size. Since the purpose of this paper is to assess the factors that give rise
84 Data
This section presents the meta-data in detail. In primary studies, the generosity
of unemployment bene￿ts is often de￿ned as the level of bene￿t replacement rate,
its duration, or the interaction of replacement rate and duration of unemployment
bene￿ts. Hence, I conduct the meta-analysis on these three dependent variables;
the coe¢ cient estimates of bene￿t replacement rate (BRR), those of duration of
unemployment bene￿ts (BD), and those of the interaction of these two (BRRBD) in
the unemployment equations. For probit estimation, I construct the binary variables
from these coe¢ cient estimates. The binary meta-dependent variable BRR10 is equal
to 1 if the coe¢ cient estimate of the bene￿t replacement rate in a primary equation
is signi￿cantly positive at the 10% level. The 34 papers give 382 observations for
bene￿t replacement rate, 111 for bene￿t duration, and 40 for the interaction of these
two. About half of the observations of the bene￿t replacement rate and its duration
are signi￿cantly positive at the 10% level. About 80% of the 40 observations of
the interaction term BRRBD are signi￿cantly positive. A substantial number of the
observations is from the primary equations where the left-hand side variable is the
natural logarithm of unemployment rate. For more comparable results, I antilog the
values from these primary equations by multiplying the natural logarithm base e.
The descriptive statistics of the respective meta-dependent variables are presented in
Table 1 in Appendix A.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how the reported estimates of the bene￿t replacement
rate and the duration of unemployment bene￿ts are scattered over years of publi-
cation.8 The dispersion in the literature on the relationship between the generosity
to signi￿cant positive coe¢ cient estimates or larger estimates rather than to ￿nd the e⁄ect size, I
include the WLS estimation as robustness check.
8For working papers and other unpublished papers, I use the year when the latest version is
written.
9of unemployment bene￿ts and the level of unemployment seem to have increased
over time. Although the positive estimates dominate, there appear more negative
estimates in the recent papers.
The meta-independent variables Zjk are dummy variables which characterise each
observation; see Table 2. I divide these variables into four groups; variables for (A)
data, (B) estimation methods, (C) model speci￿cations of the primary studies, and
(D) others. The ￿rst category of the meta-independent variables de￿nes di⁄erences in
the data used in the primary studies. Across the meta samples, two measures of ben-
e￿ts replacement rate are used. The ￿rst measure de￿nes bene￿t replacement rate as
the ￿rst year of unemployment bene￿ts, averaged over three family situations (single,
with dependent spouse, with spouse in work) and two earnings level (100% and 67%
of APW earnings). The data are provided by Nickell, who modi￿ed and completed
the OECD data set. A large fraction of the primary studies used the data with this
de￿nition. The other is the OECD summary measure of bene￿t entitlements, which
also takes unemployment durations into account.9 The latter is used in Elmeskov et
al. (1998), Belot and van Ours (2001, 2004), Boone and van Ours (2004), Macculloch
and di Tella (2002), and Kenworthy (2002) and partly in Scarpetta (1996) and Bas-
sanini and Duval (2006). The meta-independent variable ubsum=1 is for the paper
that used the OECD summary data of bene￿t entitlements, and ubsum=0 for the
paper that used the bene￿t replacement rate data by Nickell.
The second meta-independent variable for data is bdyear, which is used for the
meta-dependent variables, bene￿t duration (BD) and the interaction between re-
placement rate and duration (BRRBD). Throughout the literature, unemployment
bene￿t duration is quanti￿ed either as the maximum duration of the unemployment
9It is de￿ned as the average unemployment bene￿t replacement rate across two income situations,
three family situations, and three di⁄erent unemployment durations (1st year, 2nd and 3rd years,
and 4th and 5th years of unemployment).
10insurance bene￿ts in months or years, or as an index constructed by Nickell.10 The
studies done after the year 2002 often use the index, while earlier studies used bene￿t
duration expressed in years. The variable avg5 is equal to 1 if ￿ve-year averaged data
instead of yearly data are used.11 About 1/3 of the primary studies used ￿ve-year
averaged data.
The variables, lterm and youthun, indicate whether the primary regressions analyse
long-term respective youth unemployment rates. Besides total unemployment rate,
Nickell (1997 & 1998) analyses long- and short-term unemployment rates. Scarpetta
(1996) analyses long-term and youth unemployment rates. Esping-Andersen and
Regini (2000) also use youth unemployment rate as their dependent variable.
The meta-independent variable for data, timinvinst, is for if the studies used time-
invariant data of labour market institutions. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Chen et
al. (2003), Algan et al. (2002), as well as, earlier studies such as Jackman et al.
(1990) and Burda (1988) used time-invariant labour market institutions data.
The number of the countries that are included in the primary studies is limited to
eighteen to twenty throughout the literature due to the availability of the data.12 The
exceptions are Macculloch and Di Tella (2005) which has 21 countries by including
Greece, and Jackman et al. (1990) that have only fourteen countries.13 The country
dummy variables portugal and spain in the baseline equations and austria, ireland,
newzealand, spain, and switzerland in the robustness tests control for inclusiveness of
the respective countries. These countries have been occasionally disregarded in the
10The bene￿t duration index by Nickell is de￿ned as bd = 0:6￿ brr23
brr1 +0:4￿ brr45
brr1 , where brr1, brr23;
and brr45 refer to the ￿rst, second- and third-, and 4th- and 5th-year of gross bene￿t replacement
rates.
11I code 4 observations that use 6-year averages to avg5=1.
12These 20 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden Switzer-
land, United Kingdom and United States.
13The studies that had a smaller number of countries such as Stockhammer (2004) which had the
data of 5 countries are discarded from the meta sample.
11analyses due to the unavailability of earlier data. About one third of the primary
studies do not include Portugal.
The variable year6090 de￿nes if the primary study uses the data of the time
period between the year 1960 and the 1990s. Many studies written after the year
1999 used data from 1960 to the 1990s, because the CEP-OECD Institutions Data
Set became available. Earlier studies such as Nickell (1997 & 1998), Scarpetta (1996),
and the OECD (1999) take the time period of the 1980s and 1990s. The variables,
time60, time70, time80, and time90 indicate if the respective decades are included
in the primary analyses. About 40% of the selected primary studies used the time
periods from 1960 to sometime in the 1990s.
The second category of the meta-independent variables is estimation method.
Over 90% of the observations are estimated by the linear regression models such as
OLS, random-e⁄ects, and ￿xed-e⁄ects model. Non-linear least squares are used only
in a few studies, e.g. in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), partly in Bertola et al. (2001),
Bassanini and Duval (2006), and Macculloch and Di Tella (2005). The ols, re, fe,
and nonlinear control for the use of the respective regression methods in the primary
studies.
The third group is the variables that describe model speci￿cation. All primary
equations are unique in their choice of the explanatory and the control variables. In
general, labour market institutions such as union density, degree of coordination be-
tween union and employer in wage bargaining, employment protection legislation, as
well as tax on labour and tax wedges are often included. The meta-independent vari-
ables, ud , coord, ep, tax, and twedge describe the inclusiveness of these explanatory
variables.
The control variables vary from study to study. The macroeconomic variables
that can be argue to a⁄ect aggregate unemployment are often included in the primary
12studies. For instance, an adverse labour shock such as a decline in the gap between
the wage rate and the marginal product of labour, or a shift in production techniques
away from labour and towards capital may raise unemployment. A rise in real interest
rates a⁄ects negatively capital accumulation and productivity, thereby reduces labour
demand at a given wage level and increases unemployment (Blanchard & Wolfers,
2000). Thus, I include the use of the macroeconomic controls such as the changes
in in￿ ation, labour demand shocks, total factor productivity shock, home occupation
rate, and real interest rate in the primary literature. The meta-explanatory variables
in￿a, lds, tfps, home, and rinterest indicate whether these variables are controlled.
Moreover, ￿rstdi⁄=1 signi￿es the use of the ￿rst-di⁄erence of unemployment rate.
Baccaro and Rei (2005), Fitoussi (2000), Daveri and Tabellini (2000), and Macculloch
and Di Tella (2005) had several speci￿cations of ￿rst-di⁄erence model. There is no
observation of bene￿t duration that has the ￿rst-di⁄erence model. Also, lagun indi-
cates the use of an auto-regressive model. The studies that use annual observations
often allow for an auto-correlation of one-period.
Finally, I control for the quality of the results by adding a dummy "rank" which
equals to 1 if the study was published in the journals with the rank 3 or above in
"Keele Four-Four-Two list: Ranking of Economics Journals" and 0 otherwise. Among
the quality journals with the rank 4 the primary studies are published in European
Economic Review or Journal of Economics Perspectives. Some studies are published
in the rank 3 journals such as Economic Journal, Oxford Economics Paper, Brookings
Paper of Economic Activity, and Economic Policy. The idea is that the standard for
methodological rigor could be higher at quality journals and this could correct biases
present in other estimates (Disdier and Head, 2008).
135 Meta-Regression Analysis
This section presents the results of the meta-regression analysis. Section 5.1 presents
the baseline estimation results. Section 5.2 reports the results of the sensitivity
analysis. In section 5.3, I discuss the ￿ndings from this meta-regression analysis.14
5.1 The Baseline Results
Table 3 presents the baseline probit estimation for the binary variables of bene￿t
replacement rate (BRR10) and bene￿t duration (BD10).15 The choice of data a⁄ects
whether or not the primary studies obtain signi￿cantly positive estimates on both
bene￿t replacement rate and bene￿t duration. The studies that used the OECD sum-
mary measure of bene￿t entitlements (ubsum) and the bene￿t duration measured in
years (bdyear) have a higher probability of getting signi￿cantly positive estimates.
Studies that use ￿ve-year averaged data (avg5) are less likely to have positive esti-
mates on unemployment bene￿t replacement rate, but more likely to have positive
estimates on bene￿t duration.
The estimation method and the choice of the control variables also matter. Fixed
e⁄ects model (fe) tends to give more signi￿cantly positive estimates of the bene￿t
duration. The primary equations that control for labour demand shocks (lds) are
more likely to obtain positive correlations for the bene￿t replacement rate, but this
probability decreases for the bene￿t duration estimates. The owner occupation rate
14The issue of publication bias, which is the tendency among editors of academic journals to
publish results that are statistically signi￿cant, is beyond the scope of the current study.
15The results of the probit estimation with BRR5, BRR1, BD5, and BD1, which are the binary
meta-dependent variables indicating 1 for signi￿cant positive estimate in 5% level, respective 1%
and 0 for otherwise, are similar to those in Table 3. Due to the small number of observations, the
probit estimation of the interaction meta-dependent variable (BRRBD10) is excluded. I also applied
linear probability model on these binary data. The results are consistent with those by the probit
model. The linear probability model neither gives any meaningful results for BRRBD10 due to the
small number of observations.
14(home), which Oswald (1999) argued as an important control in the unemployment
rate-labour market institutions equations, works in opposite direction that it gives
lower probability of the positive and signi￿cant bene￿t replacement rate estimates,
while the bene￿t duration estimates are more likely to be signi￿cant and positive in
the primary unemployment equations.
Table 4 shows the OLS estimation for the coe¢ cient estimates of bene￿t replace-
ment rate (BRR), bene￿t duration (BD), and the interaction between these two
(BRRBD). As a baseline approach, the size of the reported coe¢ cient estimates are
analysed regardless of their signi￿cance or sign. Using the OECD summary data
gives a negative biasing e⁄ect to the size of the coe¢ cient estimates of BRR.16 The
studies that use the bene￿t duration measured in years tend to relatively overesti-
mate the e⁄ect of BD and underestimate that of BRRBD. Moreover, using the data
that are organised in ￿ve-year averages has a negative bias on the BRR and BRRBD
estimates, while this e⁄ect is insigni￿cant for BD.
When long-term unemployment rate or youth unemployment rate are analysed in
the primary equations, the e⁄ect size of the bene￿ts on the level of unemployment
prones to be smaller. This implies that youth population or long-term unemployed
are less likely a⁄ected by generous unemployment replacement rate. It re￿ ects the
fact that in most countries the unemployment insurance systems are often directed to
the incumbents of the labour market who have recently lost job, but not for those who
newly entered the labour market or who are unemployed for longer period. Similar
to the baseline probit estimation, the macroeconomic controls or other institutional
variables have considerable e⁄ects. For example, labour demand shocks give positive
16Unlike the conventional de￿nition of bias in the econometric literature, in this paper "posi-
tive/negative bias" implies that the particular meta-independent variable contributes to the results
above/below the average, which is predicted probability in the probit estimation or the constant in
the OLS estimation.
15bias on the coe¢ cient estimates of BRR, but negative bias on the interaction term
(BRRBD).
The highly signi￿cant positive intercepts of BRR and BRRBD can be interpreted
as the summary for the primary studies that have all meta-independent variables
equal to zero. However, these constant terms are relatively small, which means
that they are likely to be zero or negative once one starts adding alternative meta-
independent variables. The primary studies that found a positive correlation between
unemployment bene￿ts and unemployment rate can, hence, easily be altered by choos-
ing alternative empirical speci￿cations.
In all baseline equations of the probit and OLS models the dummy variable "rank"
is insigni￿cant except in the OLS model of the interaction BRRBD. It suggests that
the signi￿cance or the size of how the overall generosity of unemployment bene￿ts
a⁄ects the aggregate unemployment rate do not seem to be dependent on whether the
studies are published in the quality journals or not. The high values on the diagnostic
statistics, Wald test ￿2 and pseudo-R2 in the probit model and F-statistic and R2
in the OLS model, indicate that these baseline models are signi￿cant and perform well.
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
To test the robustness of the baseline results, a number of alternative meta-explanatory
variables describing the use of the primary data, estimation methods, and control vari-
ables are introduced. Various speci￿cations and subsets of the observations are also
probed. Besides the probit model and the OLS, I run the meta-regressions using the
weighted least squares (WLS) with weights equal to the inverse of the standard er-
rors of each observation. Overall the baseline results are robust under the alternative
16meta-explanatory variables, model speci￿cations, and estimation method.
Table 5 presents the sensitivity analysis for the coe¢ cient estimates of bene￿t
replacement rate. In columns (1) and (3), I introduce additional country dummies,
austria, ireland, newzealand, spain, and switzerland. The dummy for time period of
the data, year6090, is divided into ten-year as time60, time70, and time80. In column
(2), I use additional meta-independent variables describing estimation methods, re,
ols, and nonlinear, as well as, control for other labour market institution variables,
employment protection (ep) and union coverage (uc). I also control for the year of
publication of each study, which is non-binary and centred (publication). The highly
signi￿cant negative coe¢ cient estimate on the publication year re￿ ects what we saw
earlier in Figure 1 and 2; namely that this literature tends to deviate more as time
progresses from the early consensus concerning the positive correlation between the
generosity of unemployment bene￿ts and unemployment rate. In column (4), only
the observations that are signi￿cant at the 5% level are considered. In column (5), the
baseline speci￿cation is estimated by the WLS. The sensitivity analysis results of the
BRR estimates are robust, except the constant term became marginally insigni￿cant
when the WLS model is used.
Table 6 shows the sensitivity analysis for the bene￿t duration (BD) and the inter-
action (BRRBD). In columns (1) and (3), the alternative dummy variables describing
inclusiveness of countries, time period of the data and estimation methods of the pri-
mary regressions are used. In column (2), I control for the use of other labour market
institutions in the primary equations, as well as, publication year. In column (4), only
the reported BD estimates that are signi￿cant at the 5% level are considered. The
baseline speci￿cation for the BD is estimated by the WLS model in column (5). Col-
umn (6) and (7) are the results of the robustness checks for the BRRBD. In column
(6), the alternative variables for time of the data and publication year are speci￿ed.
17The last column is the meta-regression results for the BRRBD coe¢ cient estimates
using the WLS model.
Throughout the sensitivity tests, the biasing e⁄ect of the use of long-term and
youth unemployment rates, ￿ve-year averaged data, ￿xed e⁄ects model, and the con-
trol variables such as labour demand shocks, total factor productivity shocks, the
degree of coordination, and the owner occupation rate remain to be highly signi￿-
cant. The choice of primary variable, bdyear, may become marginally insigni￿cant in
a few speci￿cations. The negative coe¢ cient estimates on the publication year again
indicate the dissension in the literature over time.
The sensitivity analysis can be summarised as follows. First, the biasing e⁄ects of
di⁄erent data choice are in general robust except in a few cases of marginal insignif-
icance. Second, the e⁄ects of using ￿xed e⁄ects model and some control variables
remain highly robust for the bene￿t duration (BD) and the interaction between re-
placement rate and duration (BRRBD). Third, over time the literature of the e⁄ects
of generous unemployment insurance systems on unemployment rates seems to di-
verge from the positive correlation to the negative or no signi￿cant correlation. As
can be seen in Figure 1 and 2, the literature is actually moving away from a consen-
sus. This is one of the main motivation for the type of meta-analysis presented in
this paper.
5.3 Discussions
The meta-analysis of the e⁄ects of unemployment insurance system on unemployment
rates suggests the following ￿ndings. First, the choice of the primary data a⁄ects the
size of the reported estimates and the probability of obtaining signi￿cantly positive
estimates. For example, the OECD summary measure of unemployment bene￿t en-
18titlement and the bene￿t duration measured in years bias downward, respective, up-
wards. These two increase the probability of obtaining signi￿cant positive estimates
in the primary equations. Comparsion across the OLS and the probit estimation
results is, however, not straightforward, since signi￿cance is a function of two pa-
rameters, i.e. point estimates and standard errors, whereas magnitude is a fuction
of one. A positive coe¢ cient in Table 3 and a positive coe¢ cient in Table 4 are
roughly consistent in the sense of unambiguously producing evidence in favor of the
unemployment increasing e⁄ect of the generosity of unemployment bene￿ts.
Can we assess whether or not one of these data sets is better than the other? When
we compare the bene￿t replacement rate data by Nickell and the summary bene￿t
entitlements data by OECD, the values of the later data are lower than the former
except the case of Australia. The studies that used Nickell￿ s bene￿t replacement rate
alone contain insu¢ cient information on the generosity of unemployment insurance
system, since the OECD summary data takes information about the duration of the
bene￿ts into account. When it comes to the data for bene￿t duration, the index by
Nickell captures the level of bene￿ts available in the later years of a spell relative
to those available in the ￿rst year, while the bene￿t duration expressed in years
only tells the length of the duration. The BD-index by Nickell is, thus, able to
distinguish the situation in which the level of the unemployment bene￿ts decreases
over time from that when the bene￿ts do not change over time. The duration index
by Nickell contains more information about the generosity of unemployment bene￿ts.
Neverthless, these indices are far from perfect in describing reality, as Blanchard
(2007) acknowledged, "The problem is with the crude measures of institutions, not
with in unemployment".
Second, for the bene￿t duration and the interaction between bene￿t duration and
bene￿t replacement rate, ￿xed e⁄ects model increases the probability of obtaining
19signi￿cantly positive estimates as well as the size of the estimates. In other words,
the studies that estimated by ￿xed e⁄ects model prone to show stronger evidence
in support of the positive association between generous unemployment bene￿ts and
high unemployment rates. A large number of the selected studies used panel data,
which are often estimated by ￿xed e⁄ects model, random e⁄ects model, or pooled
OLS. While the ￿xed e⁄ects model only allow time-variant independent variables,
the pooled OLS can have time-invariant labour market institution variables, which
are used in earlier studies. However, with the pooled OLS, the country-speci￿c ef-
fects are restricted to zero, which is an unreasonable assumption for the cross-country
studies. In addition, the ￿xed e⁄ects model is better than the random e⁄ects model
for cross-country studies, because the former is able to control for country-speci￿c
unobserved heterogeneity. For a random e⁄ects model, one needs to make an addi-
tional assumption that the individual country e⁄ects are randomly distributed. With
a small number of observations, such as twenty countries, all within the OECD, this
assumption is unlikely to hold. The ￿xed e⁄ects model is, hence, arguably more
suitable for analysing this question.
Finally, the meta-data shows that whether the primary studies are published in the
quality journals or not does not determine if the primary estimates are signi￿cantly
positive or have higher coe¢ cient estimates. It instead seems to depend on di⁄erent
choices of empirical setting. There could be certain estimation methods and data sets
that are argued to be better than others. The current meta-study, however, does not
assess an analysis on which empirical choice is made in the quality journals.
206 Conclusion
The purpose of this study has been to explain why the numerous cross-country studies
on the relationship between the generosity of the unemployment insurance system and
the level of unemployment have reached such di⁄erent conclusions. Using a meta-
regression analysis, it is demonstrated how previous studies that use a particular
set of data, estimation methods, or model speci￿cations have a higher probability of
obtaining signi￿cantly positive results or larger coe¢ cient estimates. Based on the
￿ndings from this meta-analysis, can we now say something more about why these
studies have reached such di⁄erent results?
Since the empirical results of the primary studies are the product of several po-
tentially biasing factors, it is not always easy to see how the outcome of a study is
directly related to the empirical setting which it adopts. For example, Nickell et al.
(2001 & 2005) and Nunziata (2002) conclude that generous unemployment bene￿ts
give rise to higher unemployment. They use ￿ve-year averaged data of the period
1960-95 for twenty countries and control for changes in in￿ ation. These choices are
likely to reduce the probability of obtaining a positive relationship between unemploy-
ment bene￿ts and unemployment rates. However, they include Portugal and control
for total factor productivity shocks. These two factors can give a higher probabil-
ity of obtaining a positive association between generous unemployment bene￿ts and
unemployment rates.
On the other hand, several studies that produce negative or insigni￿cant associ-
ations can be more readily explained by the ￿ndings from this meta-analysis. Baker
et al. (2003) use the twenty-country data set with ￿ve-year averages. They estimate
the data using random e⁄ects models. They also add a control for changes in in-
￿ ation. According to the meta-analysis, the combination of these choices may have
21contributed to their negative or insigni￿cant estimates. A similar line of reasoning
can be applied to the studies of Belot and Van Ours (2001 & 2004). Excluding Portu-
gal, controlling for in￿ ation, and a use of ￿ve-year averaged data can have increased
the probability of obtaining negative and/or insigni￿cant results.
This thought-experiment leads us to a corollary. The positive relationship between
generous unemployment bene￿ts and the level of unemployment found in the studies
reported here is not readily explained using so-called the biasing factors uncovered
by this meta-analysis, while the negative and/or insigni￿cant relationship is more
readily explained by these factors. This may indicate that generous unemployment
bene￿ts in terms of high wage replacement ratio may indeed increase the level of
unemployment in cross-country studies considered in this meta-analysis.
Despite increasing dissent in the empirical results in the literature on the relation-
ship between labour market institutions and unemployment, there are still needs of
more studies. The future research may involve not only the idea that unemployment
rate is determined by labour market institutions, but also how the structure of labour
market institutions are a⁄ected over time by the level of unemployment, as well as
other economic factors. To do so, improvement of the labour market institutions data
should be preceded.
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23Appendix A Tables and Figures
Table 1: The description of the meta-dependent variables
Binary Description Mean Std. Min Max # obs
BRR10 1=BRR, positive at 10%. 0.534 0.499 0 1 382
BD10 1=BD, positive at 10%. 0.523 0.502 0 1 111
Nonbinary Mean Std. Min Max # obs
BRR Bene￿t replacement rate 0.528 1.359 -2.14 10.72 382
BD Bene￿t duration 0.225 1.275 -6.685 3.955 111
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Figure 1: The coe¢ cient estimates of the bene￿t replacement rate in the unemployment
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Figure 2: The coe¢ cient estimates of the bene￿t duration in the unemployment equations

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































# of obs. 382 96
pseudo-R2 0.346 0.502
Note: The numbers in the parentheses are robust standard errors for clustered samples
by paper. ***, **, and * denote signi￿cance of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The
explanatory variables year6090, ￿rstdi⁄, in￿a, rinterest, tfps, ud, coord, twedge, and ttax
are not presented in the table. In the regression of BD10, variables year6090, youthun,
￿rstdi⁄, and coord are dropped because they predict the failure perfectly.
28Table 4: The Baseline OLS Estimation.
BRR_OLS BD_OLS BRRBD_OLS
portugal 0.118 0.390 1.091
(0.223) (0.265) (0.054)***
avg5 -0.757 0.196 -8.911
(0.425)* (0.174) (0.171)***
ubsum/bdyear -0.883 0.757 -14.354
(0.349)** (0.309)** (0.673)***
lterm -0.643 0.010 dropped
(0.355)* (0.193)
youthun -0.632 -0.364 dropped
(0.316)* (0.527)
timinvinst -0.221 0.117 dropped
(0.289) (0.482)
fe -0.030 1.667 1.411
(0.293) (0.430)*** (0.327)***
lds 1.561 -1.460 -2.695
(0.402)*** (1.049) (1.149)*
home -0.092 0.552 0.879
(0.322) (0.247)** (0.396)*
lagun -0.478 -0.663 -10.427
(0.478) (0.442) (0.054)*
rank -0.266 -0.146 -1.184
(0.344) (0.270) (0.330)**
constant 1.385 0.068 11.759
(0.521)** (0.766) (0.638)***
# of obs. 382 111 40
F-stat. 24.25 . .
R2 0.459 0.346 0.962
Note: The numbers in the parentheses are robust standard errors for clustered samples
by paper. ***, **, and * denote signi￿cance of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The
explanatory variables year6090, ￿rstdi⁄, in￿a, rinterest, tfps, ud, coord, twedge, and ttax
are not presented in the table.
29Table 5: The Sensitivity Analysis for Bene￿t Replacement Rate.
Probit (BRR) OLS (BRR) WLS (BRR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)












avg5 -0.272 -0.188 -0.662 -1.257 -1.693
(0.100)*** (0.123) (0.321)** (0.695)* (0.318)***
ubsum 0.559 0.460 -0.452 -1.777 -2.971
(0.088)*** (0.093)*** (0.256)* (0.679)** (0.590)***








lterm -0.312 -0.457 -0.332 -1.879 -0.225
(0.093)*** (0.093)*** (0.280) (0.826)** (0.711)
youthun 0.455 0.192 -0.028 -1.300 -2.386
(0.107)** (0.229) (0.255) (0.709)* (0.743)***
timinvinst 0.425 0.101 -0.903 -0.653 -0.513
(0.09)*** (0.218) (0.452)* (0.369)* (0.965)








30￿rstdi⁄ -0.621 -0.529 -0.326 -0.106 0.057
(0.055)*** (0.083)*** (0.187)* (0.557) (0.633)
in￿a 0.055 -0.223 0.556 1.821 2.666
(0.180) (0.165) (0.357) (0.791)** (0.646)***
rinterest -0.037 -0.242 0.154 -0.198 0.392
(0.213) (0.176) (0.202) (0.223) (0.996)
lds 0.334 0.334 1.774 2.014 1.669
(0.125)** (0.129)** (0.573)*** (0.650)*** (0.453)***
home -0.352 -0.381 -0.083 0.590 1.245
(0.133)* (0.121)** (0.350) (0.668) (0.295)***
tfps 0.104 0.186 -0.580 -1.315 -0.327
(0.148) (0.174) (0.429) (0.515)** (1.291)
ud 0.019 0.106 -0.888 -2.071 -0.615
(0.133) (0.159) (0.373)** (0.806)** (0.426)
coord 0.394 0.361 0.660 0.266 0.091
(0.104)*** (0.118)*** (0.305)** (0.267) (0.343)
twedge 0.053 0.131 0.671 0.783 1.726
(0.126) (0.139) (0.306)** (0.419)* (0.504)***
ttax 0.443 0.535 0.498 -0.707 0.424
(0.140)** (0.051)*** (0.484) (0.615) (0.513)
lagun -0.034 -0.040 -0.435 -0.844 -1.665











constant 2.488 2.580 1.761
(1.277)* (0.940)** (1.099)
# of obs. 382 380 382 175 352
pseudo-R2 0.441 0.434 0.575 0.694 0.721
Note: The numbers in the parentheses are robust standard errors for clustered samples by
paper. ***, **, and * denote signi￿cance of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. In column (4),
only the observations that are signi￿cant at the 5% level are considered. Column (5) is the
weighted least squares (WLS) estimation with weights equal to the inverse of the standard
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